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The Determinants of Security Issuance Choice 
Bo Li 
Publicly listed companies have a wide range of possibilities when they seek new 
sources of financing. When doing so, they face a fundamental decision, namely what type 
of security to issue among a variety of securities including equity, debt, and hybrid 
securities such as convertible bonds, and warrants, etc. This study examines what drives 
US firms during the period of 1997-2007 to choose among convertible debt, debt, and 
equity based on their firm characteristics and macro-economic conditions through both 
binary and multi-nominal logistic regressions. 
My results suggest that, first; there are significant differences in the characteristics 
of debt-like and equity-like convertible security issuers. These differences are particularly 
apparent in the following characteristics which, from the perspective of debt-like security 
issuers, tend to be as follows: tax shields (higher), profitability (higher), firm size (larger) 
and firm age (older). Second, the issuers of debt-like convertibles tend to differ 
significantly from straight debt issuers in the following dimensions: leverage (higher), 
firm risk (higher), profitability (higher), growth opportunities (fewer), issue amounts 
(smaller), pre-announcement performance (better), industry (more high-tech firms), and 
higher issuing activity when the economic environment reflects a high financing cost for 
both debt and equity. Third, equity-like convertible issuers tend to differ from equity 
issuers in the following dimensions: firm size (larger), industry (more non-tech firms), 
profitability (lower) and pre-announcement stock performance (worse). Similar 
differences can be found when I consider models in which I examine all three security 
choices at the same time. Lastly, in a separate investigation, I find that high-tech firms 
and non-tech firms demonstrate considerable differences with respect to the determinants 
iii 
of their security issue choice. These findings provide strong support for Green's (1984) 
sweetened debt hypothesis and partial support for Stein (1992) delayed equity hypothesis. 
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1 Introduction 
Publicly listed companies have a wide range of possibilities when they seek new 
sources of financing. As an alternative to internally generated funds, they also look for 
external capital. When doing so, they face a fundamental decision, namely what type of 
security to issue. Indeed, companies can choose among a variety of securities including 
equity, debt, and hybrid securities such as convertible bonds and warrants. 
The most well-known hybrid securities are so-called convertible bonds, which are 
bonds that can be converted into the common stock of the issuing company, usually at 
some pre-announced ratio. A convertible bond has both debt- and equity-like features: it 
resembles debt because it pays a fixed coupon interest. But it also resembles equity 
because part of its purchase price is paid for the option to exchange the bond into shares. 
Although convertible bonds typically have a low coupon rate, their holders are 
compensated with the ability to convert the bonds to common stock, usually at a 
substantial discount to the stock's market value. 
From the issuer's perspective in practice, the sale of convertible bonds provides 
several benefits. The key advantage certainly lies in the reduced cash interest payment 
associated with conversions. However, in exchange for the benefit of reduced interest 
payments, the value of shareholder's equity is reduced due to the expected stock dilution 
offsets that arise when bondholders convert their bonds into new shares. 
An interesting question that arises in this context is what motivates companies to 
issue a hybrid security like a convertible bond instead of straight debt or equity. Over the 
past few decades, the literature has offered two main explanations for the use of 
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convertible debt. The sweetened debt approach (Green, 1984; Brennan and Kraus, 1987; 
Brennan and Schwartz. 1988; Mayers, 1998) perceives convertibles as instruments that 
alleviate various debt-related financing costs. On the other hand, the delayed equity 
approach (Stein, 1992) perceives convertible debt as 'backdoor' equity financing that is 
well suited for firms with high equity-related adverse selection costs. Empirical evidence 
on these two theories remains mixed. Using a example of US security issues, Lewis et al. 
(1999) obtain evidence for both the sweetened debt and the delayed equity viewpoints on 
convertible debt. Their results are different from Dutordoir and Van de Gucht, (2008) 
who examine security issues in Western European and only find evidence in support of 
the former viewpoint. 
The popularity of convertible bonds varies over time when examining trends in 
the total issue size of convertible bonds in the US during the period 1997 to 2007 in 
Table 1 for example; one can observe a decreased popularity from 1997, with a bounce-
back in 2000, and another decline afterwards. In contrast to the issue size, the number of 
convertible bonds displays a continuously decreasing pattern. The number of convertible 
bond issues is not continuously decreased along with the issue size of convertible bond; 
there is a peak in 2007 after the peak in 1997 and 2000. Debt issues not only dominate 
the market in terms of total issue size (66%), they also dominate the in terms of total 
number of issues (51%). Equity issues follow in second place (30% and 46%, 
respectively), while convertible debt ranks last (5% and 3%, respectively). A break-down 
by SIC codes demonstrates that convertible debt issues are particularly popular in the 
high-tech industry where they constitute 38.55% of the total number of issues. In this 
study, I examine the determinants of security choice including debt, equity, and 
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convertible debt and test three main motivations of security choice, namely the pecking 
order model, the agency model and the sequential model. In addition, in contrast to other 
studies in this area, my study is the first to consider how security issue choices vary 
among industries, specially the high- and non-tech industry. Basically, my findings 
provide strong support for Green's (1984) sweetened debt hypothesis and partial support 
for Stein (1992) delayed equity hypothesis. And high-tech and non-tech firms tend to 
choose different ways of raising capital and seem to have different motivations. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the following section, I 
will provide an overview of the literature and will develop my hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the sample and research methodology. Section 4 documents and discusses the 
security choice model results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Literature review 
There are number of different theoretical explanations as to why companies finance 
themselves with debt, equity or convertibles. These can be classified into several broader 
categories. 
2.1 Pecking-order model 
The pecking-order model is based on the view that information asymmetries 
between new investors and managers who maximize the wealth of existing stockholders 
make equity issues more costly than debt issues and therefore imply a financing 
hierarchy. Firms therefore prefer issuing debt to issuing equity and experience a negative 
stock price reaction if forced to issue equity. Managers with superior information acting 
in the best interests of stockholders issue equity when equity is overpriced. Managers will 
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pass up positive NPV projects if equity is sufficiently under priced. The underinvestment 
problem is avoided by issuing securities with less risk and less sensitivity to mispricing. 
Thus, there is a hierarchy of preferences; internal funding is most preferred followed by 
riskless debt, risky debt and finally equity. Hybrid securities like convertible bonds would 
fall between debt and equity. 
The proxies used to test the pecking order model are based on information 
asymmetry arguments. The firm's choice of security issue may depend on management's 
information regarding expected future performance. Since asymmetric information 
increases the cost of external financing, Korajczyk et al. (1991) argue that firms should 
issue equity during periods when information asymmetries are small. Lucas and 
McDonald (1990) suggest that firms are more likely to have more high quality 
investment projects when pre-issue stock returns are high. In addition, Myers and Majluf 
(1984) argue that firms with high financial slack may face higher costs of adverse 
selection thus reducing the probability of an equity issue. Krasker (1986) argues that the 
costs of adverse selection may be directly related to the size of the security issue. Larger 
issues increase the potential for wealth loss by exiting stockholders, thus decreasing the 
probability of an equity issue. 
When considering convertible bonds, Brennan and Kraus (1987) note that 
convertible debt can costlessly mitigate investment inefficiencies, which arises due to 
information asymmetry in the framework of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Heinkel 
(1982). The information asymmetries are related to the uncertainty regarding returns on 
investments made by firms or the uncertainty regarding the variance of returns. Brennan 
and Kraus develop a single parameter model of information asymmetry. The goal of the 
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firm is to maximize the difference between the value of the funds, obtained from the 
investors, and a true value of the firm. In equilibrium, each financing decision is chosen 
by the worst possible type of firm for those particular financing decisions. Securities that 
can lead to such equilibrium include convertible bonds, junior bonds, and bonds with 
warrants. These securities can effectively resolve the issue of adverse selection, as each 
type of firm reveals itself with the choice from the complete set of financial decisions. 
The strategy of the choice depends on the nature of the information asymmetry problem. 
In addition, Brennan and Schwartz (1988) argue that investors are willing to pay 
more for a convertible bond than for a straight bond only because of its hybrid nature. 
The cost of convertibles is evaluated as a weighted average of the straight debt and equity 
cost of convertibles. Convertible bonds are relatively insensitive to the risk of the issuing 
company because of their hybrid nature. Namely, higher risk reduces the value of the 
straight debt component, but at the same time it increases the value of the equity option 
component. The opposing offsets limit the influence of risk on the value of convertibles. 
With straight debt outstanding, shareholders have strong incentives to increase the risk of 
the company, which increases the upper potential for gains of shareholders, but reduces 
the value of straight debt. Convertibles reduce these incentives, as their value is less 
sensitive to the changes of the issuing firm risk than the value of straight debt. 
Further, in the model of Kim (1990) the convertible bond issue and in particular 
the conversion ratio serve as a signal of firm's type (good firms, medium firms, and bad 
firms in terms of quality). The conversion ratio serves as a credible signal of a company's 
future earnings. In the equilibrium, lower expected future earnings of the worse types of 
firms induce higher conversion ratios. These imply more shares per bond and thus higher 
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dilution of future earnings, as those have to be shared with a relatively larger share of 
new shareholders. The model yields a testable hypothesis that abnormal common stock 
returns at the announcements of the convertible debt issues are negatively related to the 
conversion ratio, since higher conversion ratios imply worse type firms. 
Last, according to Stein (1992) firms issue convertible bonds in order to get 
equity through the "back door" in situations where informational asymmetries make 
conventional equity issues unattractive due to high issue costs and dilution (Myers and 
Majluf 1984). In Stein's model, two factors are particularly important: call features of 
convertibles bonds and the increased possibility of financial distress due to excess debt. 
In a fully separating equilibrium good firms issue debt, medium quality firms issue 
convertible debt and bad quality firms issue equity. Financing choice therefore serves as 
the signal to the market. Announcement effects, which are generally found to be negative 
for all kinds of security type issues, are expected to be worst for equity offerings, 
somewhat better for convertible debt issues and least negative for straight debt issues. 
These expectations are in line with the adverse selection models of a capital structure. 
2.2 Agency model 
Maximizing the value of the equity claim and of the firm can, with risky debt 
outstanding, lead to agency problems. In other words, the agency model relies on the 
argument that managers sometimes pursue their own objectives, such as firm growth, at 
the expense of stockholders. Myers (1977) argues that firms whose value is primarily 
derived from growth opportunities will be less likely to finance with debt due to 
underlying underinvestment problems. Thus, Jung et al. (1996) explain that since the 
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agency costs of debt are higher for firms with better investment opportunities, the 
probability that a firm will issue equity increases with investment opportunities (growth 
options) to maximize stockholder wealth. Instead of to maximizing existing stockholder 
wealth share holders have an incentive to adopt projects with higher risk due to their 
limited liability. Green (1984) develops a model in which option claims issued with debt 
may mitigate those incentive problems. By addressing the financing and incentive 
problems simultaneously, the correct incentives can be induced with a convertible bond 
or debt-warrant combination. This motivates shareholders to take risk, as their interests 
align with new shareholder interests. However, Green's analysis abstracts from a number 
of other incentive (agency) problems, where the most important conflict is between 
management and shareholders. Therefore, Green's model does not eliminate all the 
agency costs. The crucial characteristic of convertible and warrant bonds is sharing of the 
upper potential of the equity gains, while there must be the lower bound of the gains, for 
which the fixed claim on the debt is paid (when the option is not exercised). 
2.3 Sequential model 
According to Mayers (1998), the sequential financing hypothesis is based on the 
uncertainty about the value of future investment options while Stein's model is based on 
the uncertainty about the value of the time of the issue. The sequential financing problem 
arises where an initial project that requires funding is assumed to be followed by an 
investment option that also requires funding if it is profitable. Providing funds up front 
for both the project and the option creates an incentive conflict between the manager who 
makes the investment decision and those who provide the funds. Compared to straight 
bonds, convertible bonds economize on issue costs, because they leave funds in the firm 
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(convertibility feature) and reduce the leverage when the investment option is valuable. 
On the other hand, convertibles control the overinvestment problem (Jensen, 1986) when 
the investment option is not valuable. The call provision is an important feature of 
convertible bonds, when there is uncertainty about the maturity date of the investment 
option. Mayers notes that existing evidence on convertible bonds supports the sequential 
financing hypothesis, which is also consistent with other theories. The sequential 
financing hypothesis has no direct implication for stock price reactions at the time of 
convertible debt announcements. However, as none of the other motivations for the use 
of convertible debt predicts any additional investment at the time of conversion, evidence 
of investment related activity at the time of conversion would support the sequential-
financing hypothesis. 
2.4 Timing model 
The timing model has evolved from the finding of Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) that firms experience long term underperformance 
after they issue equity. As argued by Stein (1992), if equity is overpriced and the market 
under-reacts to equity issues, then management maximizes the wealth of existing 
stockholders by issuing equity. Jung et al. (1996) argue that if the timing model plays an 
important role in the issuing firm's decision, long-term cumulative excess returns should 
significantly affect the firm's issuing decision because the timing model relies on the 
argument that management knows when future performance will be poor and issues 
accordingly. In addition, Lee and Loughran (1998) document that there is poor stock 
performance in the years following a convertible bond offering. This persistence has been 
proved when controlling for the stock underperformance after the IPO. 
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The empirical studies of Green (1984), Stein (1992) and Mayers (1998) are the 
first to extend the security choice framework to include the choice of convertible debt as 
an alternative to equity or straight debt. Later, Lewis et al. (1999) investigates Stein's 
backdoor equity hypothesis and Green's risk shifting hypothesis using a sample of 203 
convertible issues that took place in the U.S. between 1977 and 1984. They argue that 
convertible debt can be viewed as an alternative or substitute for straight debt or equity. 
Lewis' et al. classify convertible debt offers as either debt- or equity-like by estimating 
the probability of conversion of convertible bonds into equity at the maturity, "debt-like" 
firms issue convertible debt to reduce the agency costs associated with asset substitution 
problems while "equity-like" firms substitute convertible debt for common equity to 
reduce the adverse selection costs associated with seasoned equity offers. Lewis et al. 
(1999) find that firms with higher tax shields, stock return volatility, issue size and larger 
firms are more likely to issue debt-like securities (debt and convertible debt whose 
probability of conversion at maturity is low) and firms with higher leverage, higher 
growth opportunities, higher pre-announcement performance are more likely to issue 
equity-like securities (equity and convertible debt whose probability of conversion at 
maturity is high). Their results suggest that the security choice model of Jung et al. 
(1996) is robust when the financing set is enlarged to include financing instruments other 
than debt and equity and that both agency conflicts and information asymmetries impact 
the decision to issue convertible debt. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Sample data 
3.1.1 Sample selection 
Firms in this study are public and listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or the over-the-counter (OTC) market, 
such as the NASDAQ. The announcement date and issuance date information is collected 
from the SDC Platinum new issue database for the period from January 1997 to 
December 2007. Daily returns for the overall stock market and for individual firms are 
obtained from CRSP. All accounting information is collected from Standard & Poor's 
Compustat and macroeconomic information is from Bloomberg. Sample screening 
process is provided by Table 3. 
Specific selection criteria: 
1) Following Guillaume et al. (2004), I exclude firms that do not list on one of these 
three exchanges because of data availability. 
2) After excluding financial firms and utility firms and removing firms that have no 
information on issue-years and/or CUSIP I get a raw dataset for U.S. new security issues 
that comprises 179 convertible debt offerings made by 153 firms, 3,531 straight bond 
offerings made by 673 firms, and 3,152 equity offerings (SEOs) made by 2,578 firms. 
3) I exclude issues of different security types made by the same firm during the same 
fiscal year. 
There are 305 dual straight debt-equity issues, 82 dual convertible debt-straight debt 
issues, 102 dual convertible debt-equity issues, and 43 triple straight debt, convertible 
10 
debt, and equity issues. In line with Ilovakimian et al. (2001), I remove all dual and triple 
security issues from the dataset. This makes the logistic regression results more easily 
interpretable, since only exclusive financing choices are included in my models. 
4) Only issues of firms with accounting and stock price data for the fiscal year prior 
to the announcement, and with security-related data (e.g., announcement and issue date, 
conversion premium of the convertible debt issues, amount issued, maturity date, and 
dividend yield) available in Compustat, CRSP, and SDC are retained. The resulting final 
sample contains 33 convertible debt offerings, 286 straight bond offerings, and 838 
equity offerings (SEOs) excluding those firms which issue multiple times within the same 
year. 
3.1.2 Sample characteristics 
When examining trend in issuing activity over time, I find that there are 
substantial temporal fluctuations in the volume of equity and straight debt offerings. 
Table 2 reports that the total amount of capital raised peaked in 2007 for convertibles, in 
2001 for debt, and in 1999 for equity while the number of security issues peaked in 2007 
for convertibles, in 1998 for debt, and in 1999 for equity. The total sample of security 
issues is comprised of 3% convertibles, 66% debt, and 31% equity in terms of issue 
amount and 3% convertibles, 25% debt, and 72% equity in terms of number of issues. 
The high number of convertible debt issues in year 2007 is likely due to market 
conditions in that the stock market was in a bull phase and interest rates were at a high 
level (which leads to a relatively high level of cost for issuing straight debt). These 
factors make a convertible issue attractive to both the issuing firm and the investor. The 
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results are similar to Ramanlal et al.'s (1999) finding in the U.S. market that managers 
issue more convertible debt during bull markets and when interest rates are relatively 
high. A break-down of the sample by SIC codes demonstrates that convertible debt issues 
are particularly prevailing in the high-tech industry where they constitute 36.36% of total 
number of issues. 
3.1.3 Explanatory variables 
3.1.3.1 Firm specific variables 
Firm specific characteristics that are hypothesized to be determinants of a company's 
security choice include the firm's potential tax shield, the financial risk of the firm, 
growth options, profitability, firm size, relative issue size, stock price volatility, stock 
run-up, firm age, high-tech dummy and consecutive issue dummy. The variable list is 
provided in Table 5 and the descriptive statistics of each of the variables are given in 
Table 6. 
Although the various sweetened debt models consider different kinds of debt-
related financing costs, the proxies that can be used to capture these financing problems 
are largely similar. Therefore, I can only assess the joint validity of these models. In line 
with Dutordoir, M., and Van de Gucht, L (2008), all firm-specific variables are 
measured at the fiscal year-end preceding the security announcement date. Tax 
considerations are proxied by a tax shield measure defined as total tax paid over total 
assets on the firm's balance sheet. Firms with more tax liabilities benefit more from a 
debt (-type) issue since interest payments can be deducted from corporate tax payments. 
Financial distress is proxied by financial risk (leverage) measured as long term debt over 
total assets. Firms with higher leverage have more potential for asset substitution and 
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risk-related adverse selection costs. Moreover, higher leverage enhances the 
attractiveness of convertible debt as a sequential-financing device, since potential 
savings from reducing debt by calling the convertible should be larger when current 
leverage is higher (Mayers, 1998). In line with Lewis et al. (1999), growth options are 
measured as the market value of equity over total assets. Firms with highly profitable 
growth opportunities tend to issue convertible debt because they have higher levels of 
information asymmetry about their value and risk which incurs higher costs of issuing 
both straight debt and equity (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988; Lewis et al, 1999). 
Profitability is proxied for by considering either cash flow over total assets or ROA. For 
the former, we create a "positive dummy" that takes on a value of 1 for firms whose 
cash flow over total assets is equal to or greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, a 
"negative dummy" takes on a value of 1 for firms whose cash flow over total assets is 
less than zero, 0 otherwise. Firm size is measured by the natural log of total assets. It is 
generally assumed that larger firms face smaller information asymmetries regarding 
their (future) value and risk, and thus incur lower debt- and equity-related financing 
costs (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988; Lewis et al, 1999). In line with Dutordoir, M., and 
Van de Gucht, L.(2008). relative issue size is calculated as the total issue amount over 
the market value of equity one week prior to the announcement date. According to 
Krasker (1986), issues with large offering proceeds increase the potential for wealth 
losses by existing shareholders, and should thus be associated with higher adverse 
selection costs. Firms may have the habit to issue the same type security for their 
comfort. The tendency of issuing the same type of security is accounted for by using a 
dummy variable, "consecutive issues", which takes a value of 1 if the firm had at least 
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two consecutive issues at the same type of security within a one-year period or 0 
otherwise. Firm age is proxied by the number of years since its IPO or the number of 
years since the firm was founded. High-tech is a dummy variable, and takes on a value 
of 1 if the issuing firm belongs to a high-tech industry according to the classification by 
the American Electronics Association1, or 0 otherwise. Bubble is a dummy variable, 
which takes on a value of 1 if the issue date is in the 1999-2001 time frame, 0 otherwise. 
Post-bubble is a dummy variable, and takes on a value of 1 if the issue date is after year 
2001, 0 otherwise. In line with Lewis et al. (1999), Volatility denotes the standard 
deviation of the daily stock returns estimated over trading days (-240, -40). Firms with a 
higher stock return volatility are assumed to face higher asset substitution and risk-
related adverse selection costs. Stock ret is the average of daily stock returns measured 
over the window (-75,-1) relative to the announcement date. When firms with high stock 
returns issue equity, stockholders are more likely to infer that the firm is overvalued, 
leading to higher equity-related adverse selection costs. 
There are some interesting points that are worthwhile mentioning. On one side, 
Table 6 indicates that convertible debt and equity issuers have higher financial risks 
measured by leverage (total long term debt over total assets) than debt issuers, which is 
inconsistent with the financial distress argument that firms with higher leverage choose 
equity or equity-like securities; on the other side, convertible debt issuers demonstrate 
they have the lowest tax shield, which is consistent with the earlier observation that the 
convertible debt issues in my sample are more debt-like because of their conversion 
probability is as high as 44%. In addition, it appears that convertible debt issuers 
1
 See appendix for the definition of high-tech industry 
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experience positive pre-announcement performance, and the level of the stock price 
reaction falls between investors' response to straight debt and common equity offerings, 
which is the expected reaction for convertibles. Last, typical convertible debt issuers 
seems to have a similar firm size (as measured by the natural log of total assets) as debt 
issuers but have closer relative issue size (as measured by the total issue amount over the 
market value of equity) with equity issuers, non-consecutive issuer (as measured by the 
consecutive dummy variable), more likely in high-tech industry. 
Table 6 provides sample mean-test and median-test statistics for comparisons 
between convertible debt and straight debt or equity issuers, respectively. For 
completeness, I also compare straight debt to equity issuers. The table shows that 
convertible issuers are significantly different from straight debt issuers on all dimensions 
except for the market-to-book ratio, as well as bubble, and post-bubble dummies. 
Specifically, convertible issuers are non-consecutive issuers clustered in the high-tech 
industry and are significantly younger, less profitable, lower tax shield, smaller firm 
size, and a significantly higher leverage, relative issue size, stock return volatility and 
stock return. Convertible issuers also differ significantly from equity issuers on several 
dimensions: they are non-consecutive issuers having a higher leverage, a larger relative 
issue size, a higher stock return volatility, older firm age and bigger firm size, but 
smaller stock returns. 
In terms of high-tech sub-samples, high-tech convertible debt issuers have 
significantly difference with high-tech debt issuers on these dimensions: consecutive 
issues, market-to-book ratio, firm size, issue size and volatility. More specific speaking, 
high-tech convertible issuers are consecutive issuers with larger firm size, higher 
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leverage, smaller issue size, lower stock return volatility. Comparing to high-tech 
straight debt, high-tech convertible issuers differ significantly from high-tech equity 
issuers on these dimensions: they are consecutive issuers having higher leverage, less 
profitability, smaller firm size, larger issue size, higher stock return volatility, younger 
firm age, clustering in IT bubble years. 
In terms of non-tech sub-samples, non-tech convertible debt issuers have 
significantly difference with non-tech debt issuers on all dimensions except for the 
market-book ratio, bubble, and post-bubble. More specifically, non-tech convertible 
issuers are non-consecutive issuers with less profitability, higher leverage, less tax 
benefit, smaller firm size, larger issue size, higher stock return volatility, better pre-
announcement stock performance, younger age. Comparing to non-tech straight debt, 
non-tech convertible issuers differ significantly from non-tech equity issuers on these 
dimensions: they are non-consecutive issuers having higher leverage, larger firm size, 
smaller issue size, higher stock return volatility, and older firm age. In summary, high-
tech and non-tech firms tend to choose different ways of raising capital and seem to 
have different motivations when making their financing choices. 
In the next section, I use a more sophisticated regression procedure to examine 
issuers' motivations in a multivariate context. 
3.1.3.2 Control variables 
Several authors argue that financing costs vary not only on a firm-specific level 
but also on an economy-wide level, e.g., due to temporal fluctuations in the availability of 
profitable investment opportunities and in the level of asymmetric information about firm 
value and firm risk (Choe et ah, 1993; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996; Korajczyk and 
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Levy, 2003). Prior empirical evidence on the impact of aggregate financing costs on the 
choice between straight debt, convertible debt and equity is scarce and inconsistent 
(Billingsley et al. 1988; Lewis et al., 1999; Krishnaswami and Yaman, 2008). 
I add both macroeconomic indicators to capture temporal fluctuations in 
economy-wide financing costs. The definitions of my macroeconomic indicators are 
consistent with those used by Choe et al. (1993). Market ret is the average daily stock 
index return calculated over the window (-60,-1) and serves as an inverse measure for the 
economy wide level of equity-related financing costs. TB Yield is the yield on five-year 
US Treasury Bonds, expressed as an average value over the three months preceding the 
issue month, serves as a direct proxy for the economy wide level of debt-related 
financing costs Leading indicator for the general business condition is defined as the US 
leading indicator index monthly return, an average value over the three months prior to 
the announcement month. 
3.2 Research design 
3.2.1 Testable hypotheses 
My paper adopts a two-step security choice framework as in Lewis et al. (1999) to 
assess the validity of the sweetened debt and delayed equity viewpoints for US security 
issuance in the period from 1997 to 2007. I evaluate the joint validity of the sweetened 
debt (Green 1984) explanations by testing the following hypotheses. 
HI: Conditioning on a debt-type security choice, firms with high debt-related financing 
costs substitute debt-like convertible debt for straight debt. 
The delayed equity (Stein 1992) hypothesis is evaluated by testing hypotheses 2. 
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H2: Conditioning on an equity-type security choice, firms with high equity-related 
adverse selection costs substitute equity-like convertible debt for straight debt. 
3.2.2 Binary logistic model 
I model convertible debt issuance decisions by means of the two-step security choice 
framework proposed by Lewis et al. (1999). 
In step 1, firms decide whether to issue a debt-type security (straight debt and debt-
like convertible debt) or an equity-type security (equity and equity-like convertible debt). 
For the dependent variable, debt is assigned a value of 0, while equity is assigned a value 
of 1. For convertibles, I label the dependent variables according to the probability that the 
convertible bond will convert into equity at maturity as a dependent variable. The 
conversion probability value is estimated using the standard Black-Scholes assumptions. 
That is, I assume that the underlying common stock follows a diffusion process described 
by geometric Brownian motion. This probability is then calculated as N (d2), with N (.) 
being the cumulative probability under a standard normal distribution function and d2 
being determined as: 
where 8 is the continuously-compounded dividend yield for the year-end preceding the 
announcement date; T is the initial convertible debt maturity (in years); S is the price of 
the underlying stock measured one week (5 trading days) prior to the announcement date; 
X is the conversion price; r is the continuously-compounded yield on a five-year US 
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Treasury Bond on the announcement date; and a is the stock return volatility per annum 
over the period 240 to 40 trading days prior to the announcement date. 
The average (median) conversion probability of convertible debt issues is 34.1% 
(33.4%)2. Then I use this value as the cut-off value for classifying the dependent variable; 
that is, for all convertibles with N (d2) equal or larger than 0.34 (or 0.334), the dependent 
variable is assigned a value of 1, otherwise, it is assigned a value of 0. My first model can 
then be expressed as follows: 
Model 1 
Security choice = Logit (Leverage, Volatility, CF_TA*Positive dummy, 
CF_TA*Negative dummy, Growth, Firm size, Relative issue 
size, Stock Ret, Consecutive Issues, Age, High-tech, Bubble , 
Post-bubble, TB Yield, Market Ret, Leading Indicator) 
(1) 
where security choice is 0 for debt-type securities, and 1 for equity-type securities. 
In step 2, I examine the determinants of the security choice within the debt-type 
and the equity-type security groups separately, within each group using the same 
explanatory variables as those included in my Model 1 analysis. Lewis et al. (1999) label 
all convertible offerings with a conversion probability lower than 50% as being debt-like 
and all other convertibles as being equity-like. In this way, their sample is almost evenly 
split between debt-like and equity-like issues. Using a similar criterion for my sample, I 
identify 10 equity-like convertibles and 23 debt-like convertible after excluding 
observations with missing data for calculating N (d2). 
2
 Note that this percentage is substantially smaller than the median conversion probability of 50.03% 
recorded for the US convertibles studied by Lewis et al. (1999). 
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Following Dutordoir, M., and Van de Gucht, L.(2008), in the debt-type security 
sub-group, I examine the determinants of the choice between debt-like convertibles and 
straight debt. The dependent variable of the logistic regression equals one for debt-like 
convertibles, and zero for straight debt. In the equity-type security sub-group, the 
dependent variable equals one for equity-like convertibles, and zero for equity. Thus I 
estimate the following two models: 
Model 2 
Security choice = Logit (Leverage, Volatility, CF_TA*Positive dummy, 
CF_TA*Negative dummy, Growth, Firm size, Relative issue 
size, Stock Ret, Consecutive Issues, Age, High-tech, Bubble , 
Post-bubble, TB Yield, Market Ret, Leading Indicator) 
(2) 
where security choice is 0 for debt, and 1 for debt-like convertible bonds. 
Model 3 
Security choice = Logit (Leverage, Volatility, CF_TA*Positive dummy, 
CF_TA*Negative dummy, Growth, Firm size, Relative issue 
size, Stock Ret, Consecutive Issues, Age, High-tech, Bubble , 
Post-bubble, TB Yield, Market Ret, Leading Indicator) 
(3) 
where security choice is 0 for equity, and 1 for equity-like convertible bonds. 
3.2.3 Multi-nominal logistic model 
I extend the security choice model from a binary logistic regression to a multi-
nominal logistic regression by including three types of instruments, namely convertibles, 
straight debt, and equity by using the same explanatory variables as those included in 
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Model 1. The dependent variables are assigned a value of 0 for debt, 1 for convertibles, 
and 2 for equity. My model thus reads as follows: 
Model 4 
Security choice = Logit (Leverage, Volatility, CF_TA*Positive dummy, 
CF_TA*Negative dummy, Growth, Firm size, Relative issue 
size, Stock Ret, Consecutive Issues, Age, High-tech, Bubble , 
Post-bubble, TB Yield, Market Ret, Leading Indicator) 
(4) 
where security choice is 0 for convertibles, 1 for debt, and 2 for equity. 
4 Empirical results and analysis 
4.1 Determinants of the choice between debt-like securities and equity-like securities 
Table 7 reports the results for the first step logistic regression analysis. Since the 
dependent variable measures the level of the equity-likeness of the chosen security 
(which is assigned 1 for equity), I expect the coefficient proxies for the debt related 
financing costs to be positive and the coefficient proxies for the equity related financing 
costs to be negative. Therefore, a positive coefficient indicates that the firm is more likely 
to issue an equity type security. I present results for 4 regressions. Regression 1 includes 
basic measures for profitability (cash flow over total assets), relative issue size, and firm 
age (years since the firm's IPO date). Regression 2 does the same thing as regression 1 
except that it uses the natural logarithm of the relative issue size. Regression 3 uses years 
since the firm's founding date as an alternative measure for firm age. Regression 4 does 
the same thing as regression 1 except that it uses ROA (return on assets) as a measure for 
firm profitability instead of cash flow over total assets. 
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The results in Table 7 show that, in terms of the full sample, firm size, firm age, 
stock returns and the bubble dummy are the most significant security choice determinants 
across all regressions. Specifically, my results suggest that smaller & younger firms with 
better pre-announcement performance in IT bubble years are more likely to issue equity-
type securities. The findings that firm size and stock ret matter is similar to those found in 
Jung et al. (1996) who examine the choice between debt and equity and Lewis et al. 
(1999) who include convertible debt in addition to debt and equity in their security choice 
model. Further, profitability (profitable firms only) is negatively significant across three 
of my four regressions, which suggests that firms with higher profitability are more likely 
to issue debt-type securities, which supports theoretical argument involving financial 
distress costs and the sequential model. The tax shield influence is negatively significant 
for three out of four regressions, suggesting that firms with higher tax shields are more 
likely to issue debt-type security. The results support the impact of taxation on debt 
issues. Lastly, the post-bubble dummy is positive significant across three out of four 
regressions, indicating that firms that had post bubble (after year 2001) issues are more 
likely to issue equity-like securities. The t-bill yield is negative and significant across all 
regressions, which is different from my expectations. In brief, for the full sample, I find 
that larger and older firms with higher tax shields, higher profitability are more likely to 
issue debt-like securities while smaller and younger firms with better pre-announcement 
performance and issues during or after year 1999 are more likely to issue equity-like 
securities. 
For the high-tech sub-sample, I re-run regressions 1 to 4 in the same manner. I 
find that except for the bubble dummy, firm size, firm age, and stock ret remain as the 
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most significant security choice determinants across all regressions. Further, non-
profitability (unprofitable firms only) is significantly positive across three out of four 
regressions which imply that firms running at a loss more likely to issue equity-like 
securities. In short, larger and older high-tech firms are more likely to issue debt-like 
securities while un-profitable high-tech firms with better pre-announcement performance 
are more likely to issue equity-like securities. 
I also re-run regressions 1 to 4 for my non-tech sub-sample. Here, I find that firm 
size, firm age, and stock return still act as the most significant security choice 
determinants across all regressions, which is similar to what I found in the full sample 
and the high-tech sub-sample. Different from the high-tech sub-sample, profitability 
(profitable firms only) is significantly negative in three out of four regressions, which 
suggests that non-tech firms with higher profitability are more likely to issue debt-type 
securities, similar to what I found in the full sample. Further, consecutive issues exert a 
significant positive influence in all regressions, which suggest that non-tech firms with 
consecutive issues of the same type of security prefer to issue equity-like securities. In 
short, larger, older and profitable non-tech firms are more likely to issue debt-like 
securities while non-tech consecutively issuing firms with better pre-announcement 
performance are more likely to issue equity-like securities. 
4.2 Determinants of the choice between debt-like convertibles and straight debt 
Table 8 reports results for the second step logistic regression analysis on the debt-
type security sub-sample. It examines the determinants of the choice between debt-like 
convertibles and straight debt. The dependent variable of the logistic regression equals 
one for debt-like convertibles, and zero for straight debt. I expect that firms with higher 
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debt-related costs prefer to issue debt-like convertibles over debt. The results in Table 8 
show that volatility and the high-tech dummy have a significant positive influence across 
all four regressions. This suggests that high-tech firms with higher risk are more likely to 
issue debt-like convertibles than straight debt. Further, our proxy for growth 
opportunities is significantly negative in three of the four regressions. This suggests that 
firms with fewer growth opportunities are more likely to issue convertible debt. 
According to Brennan and Schwartz (1988) and Lewis et al. (1999), firms with more 
growth opportunities tend to have a higher level of information asymmetry about their 
future value and risk, and thus incur higher costs of issuing both straight debt and equity. 
Moreover, the availability of growth opportunities increases the possibility that 
convertible debt will be used as a sequential financing tool (Mayer, 1998). Further, 
consistent with my expectation, variable leverage (as a proxy for financial distress risk) is 
significantly positive in most regressions which implies that firms with higher financial 
distress risk are more likely to issue convertible debt. The results are in line with Mayers 
(1998) who claim that higher leverage enhances the attractiveness of convertible debt as a 
sequential financing device. In addition, relative issue size is negative and significant in 
three regressions, which suggests that firms with larger capital needs are more inclined to 
issue straight debt instead of convertible debt. As expected, I also find that firms are 
significantly more likely to issue debt-like convertible debt than straight debt after a 
larger stock ret given the equity component embedded in debt-like convertibles. Lastly, 
profitability (profitable firms only) has a significant positive influence in three out of four 
regressions, indicating that lucrative firms are more apt to issue convertible debt. In terms 
of control variables, market ret has a significant positive impact on security choice in 
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three out of four regressions. It appears that convertible debt issues are more likely when 
the economy-wide level of equity-related financing costs (measured by market return, an 
inverse proxy) is high. The t-bill yield also shows a strong positive influence in all 
regressions, indicating that convertible debt issues are preferred when the straight debt-
related financing cost is high. Simply put, I find that firms with higher leverage, firm risk, 
and profitability, fewer growth opportunities, a smaller issue amount, better pre-
announcement performance as well as high-tech firms are more likely to issue debt-like 
convertible debt than straight debt when the economic environment is indicative of a high 
financing cost stage for both debt and equity. 
For the high-tech sub-sample, I re-run regressions 1 to 4 in the same manner. 
Interestingly, I find that none of the firm characteristic variables is significance in most 
regressions. 
I also re-run regressions 1 to 4 in the same manner for non-tech firms. Different 
from my high-tech sub-sample but similar with the full sample (except for the relative 
issue size variable), I find that all of the variables including growth opportunity, leverage, 
profitability in terms of profitable firms, volatility, stock ret, firm age, market ret, and the 
T-bill yield have a significantly positive coefficients in most regressions. Summing up, I 
find that non-tech firms with higher profitability, leverage, firm risk, and higher 
profitability, less growth opportunities, better pre-announcement performance and 
younger firms are more likely to issue debt-like convertible debt than straight debt when 
the economic environment is in a high financing cost stage for both debt and equity. 
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4.3 Determinants of the choice between equity-like convertibles and equity 
Table 9 reports results for the second step logistic regression analysis for the 
equity-type security sub-sample, where the dependent variable equals one for equity-like 
convertibles, and zero for equity. I expect that firms with higher equity-related adverse 
selection costs prefer to issue equity-like convertibles over equity. The results in Table 9 
show that, in terms of the full sample, profitability (profitable firms only), the high-tech 
dummy, and stock ret have significantly negative coefficients in almost all regressions, 
which suggest that high-tech firms with higher profitability and better pre-announcement 
stock performance are less likely to issue equity-like convertible debt instead of equity. 
Further, firm size is significantly positive in all regressions. It advises that bigger firms 
tend to issue equity-like convertible debt over equity. Different from my expectations, 
leverage is significantly positive and relative issue size is significantly negative in most 
regressions. The latter two results are counter intuitive given the debt component 
embedded in equity-like convertibles. The potential reason for the unexpected sign for 
leverage may be that the firms with high leverage have a relatively weaker debt capacity, 
in the sense that the large amount of debt they have outstanding makes it difficult for 
them to issue more debt even though they prefer to. Thus, they have to choose equity-like 
securities in which equity-like convertible debt is more similar as debt. The possible 
reason for the unexpected sign for relative issue size may be that the firms with large 
issue amounts are facing a potentially big change of their capital structure in the near 
future after their issuance, which drives them to prefer to issue equity instead of 
convertibles to offset these changes. In terms of my control variables, I find that firms are 
significantly more likely to issue equity instead of equity-like convertible debt when 
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economic prospects (represented by the leading indicator) are favorable. Market ret has a 
significantly negative coefficient for three out of four regressions. It appears that 
convertible debt issues are more likely when the economy wide level of equity-related 
financing costs (measured by market ret, an inverse proxy) is high, which supports the 
delayed equity point of view. The T-bill yield is significantly positive in all regressions, 
which is different from my expectation. This suggests that convertible debt issues are 
preferred over equity when debt-related financing costs (measured by the T-bill yield) is 
high; the reason however is unclear. In short, I find that larger non-tech firms with higher 
leverage, smaller issue size, lower profitability and worse pre-announcement stock 
performance are more likely to issue equity-like convertible debt than equity. 
When looking at my high-tech versus non-tech sub-samples, I find some 
indication that tax shields are one of the main drivers of a firm's security choice (the tax 
shield variable is significantly positive in all regressions, suggesting that high-tech firms 
with larger potential tax benefit are more likely to issue equity-like convertibles than 
equity). Because of the small sample size in the corresponding models, my results 
provide at best a potential indication, and further research may be warranted to provide 
more conclusive evidence. For the same reason, the results are not included as part of my 
main tables, but are instead provided in the Appendix. 
When considering my non-tech sub-sample, I find that firm size has a significant 
positive effect while stock ret has s significant negative effect in all regressions, which 
suggests that larger non-tech firms with worse pre-announcement performance prefer to 
issue equity-like convertible debt rather than equity. Again, different from my 
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expectation but similar with the results in the full sample, leverage is significantly 
positive and relative issue size is significantly negative in most regressions. 
4.4 Determinants of the choice among straight debt, convertible debt, and equity 
The results in Table 10 show that across all regressions, leverage is significantly 
negatively for the choice between debt and convertible debt suggesting that firms with 
higher financial risk prefer to issue convertibles over debt, which supports the sweetened 
debt viewpoint; but it's also significantly negative for the choice between equity and 
convertible debt indicating that firms with higher financial risk prefer to issue 
convertibles over equity (which does not support the delayed equity viewpoint and the 
financial distress argument); the reason may be lie in firms having weak debt capacity as 
1 mentioned in my discussion of Table 9 results above. Further, firm size and firm age is 
significantly positive across all regressions for the choice between debt and convertible 
debt and significantly negative for the choice between equity and convertible debt. This 
indicates that larger and older firms are more likely to issue debt than convertible debt 
and also more likely to issue convertible debt than equity. Relative issue size is 
significantly positive across all regressions for both the choice between convertible debt 
and debt and the choice between convertible debt and equity, indicating that firms that 
plan to raise large amounts of capital tend to do so by means of a debt or equity issue 
rather than a convertible debt issue. But my expectation is relative issue size is 
significantly positive in all regressions for the choice between convertible debt and debt 
while significantly negative in all regressions for the choice between convertible debt and 
equity. The issue size results does not support the pecking order model's claim that firms 
facing higher information asymmetries should issue securities that are less sensitive to 
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mispricing. The possible reason may be that the firms tend to offset the change of big 
future capital structure as I reasoned in my discussion of Table 9. In addition, volatility as 
a proxy for debt-related financing costs is significantly negative for the choice between 
debt and convertible debt suggesting that firms with relatively higher risk tend to issue 
convertibles over debt, which supports the sweetened debt viewpoint; but it's also 
significantly negative for the choice between equity and convertible debt indicating that 
firms with higher risk tend to issue convertibles over equity (which does not support the 
delayed equity viewpoint). Lastly, stock ret is significantly negative in all regressions for 
the choice between convertible debt and debt but positively significant for the choice 
between convertible debt and equity, revealing that firms with relatively better pre-
announcement performance tend to issue convertible debt rather than debt while firms 
with relative worse pre-announcement performance have a tendency to issue convertible 
debt than equity. The T-bill yield is significantly negative in all regressions for the choice 
between convertibles and equity, which is different with my expectation. In summary, I 
find that smaller and younger firms with higher leverage, higher firm risk, smaller issue 
size, and better pre-announcement performance are more likely to issue convertible debt 
rather than straight debt while relative larger and older firms with higher leverage, higher 
firm risk, smaller issue size, and worse pre-announcement performance are more likely to 
issue convertible debt than equity. 
When considering my high-tech sub-sample, firm size remains as the only 
significant determinant of a firm's security choice. It is significantly positively in all 
regressions for the choice between convertible debt and debt and significantly negative 
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for the choice between convertible debt and equity, suggesting that smaller size high-tech 
firms are more likely to issue convertible debt as is also the case in my full sample. 
When considering my non-tech sub-sample, firm size again remains as a 
significant determinant of security choice (as I found for the full sample and the high-tech 
sub-sample), in addition, I find similar results for leverage, that is, leverage is 
significantly negatively in all regressions for both the choice between debt and 
convertible debt and the choice between equity and convertible debt. Overall, the results 
indicate that smaller non-tech firms with higher leverage lean towards issuing convertible 
debt rather than straight debt while larger non-tech firms with higher leverage lean 
towards issuing convertible debt rather than equity as is the same case in my full sample. 
4.5 Robustness tests 
4.5.1 Tests for model 2 and 3 
In line with Dutordoir, M, and Van de Gucht, L.(2008), I use call features on 
convertible debt as an alternative equity component measure instead of conversion 
probability. As such, I re-estimate Model 2 and 3 with debt-like (equity-like) convertibles 
defined as issues without (with) a call feature. Under this classification, 94% of the 
convertibles are considered as debt-like. The results are intact with those obtained by 
means of the probability of conversion. Thus, my main findings do not depend on the 
specific benchmark used for the debt-like versus equity-like classification. 
4.5.2 Tests for model 1 to model 4 
All the binary models and multinomial models are rerun using alternative 
specifications for profitability (now measured as ROA), relative issue size (now 
measured as the natural logarithm of relative issue size), and age (now measured as years 
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since the firm is founded). Again, I find that the results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 7 - Table 10 where I used the original specifications for these variables. 
Thus, my main conclusions remain. 
4.6 Discussion 
The regression results reported in Table 8 and 9 suggest that convertible debt is 
used to not only alleviate firm-specific debt-related financing costs, but also to mitigate 
firm-specific equity-related financing costs. This conclusion is in line with the US 
evidence that supports both view points for convertible debt (Billingsley and Smith, 
1996; Lewis et al.„ 1999). The regression results reported in Table 10 indicate that 
convertible debt is used to lessen firm-specific debt-related financing costs but not to 
mitigate firm-specific equity-related financing costs. 
The divergence between my findings (in terms of the choice between convertibles 
and equity and the choice between equity-like convertibles and equity, and specially for 
variables such as leverage, relative issue size, and volatility) and the expected results 
based on the previous literature might be driven by the weak debt capacity, which force 
firms to choose equity type securities but better to have debt-like components such as 
convertibles. It may also be driven by firms trying to counter-balance potential capital 
structure changes since changes in a firm's capital structure may provide outsiders with a 
signal with respect to a change of firm value. 
The lack of supportive evidence for the delayed equity hypothesis in a 
multivariate context may be due to the small number of equity-like convertibles in my 
sample. However, similar to Dutordoir and Van de Gucht (2008) the low conversion 
probability is not an idiosyncratic feature of our sample, but is representative of the US 
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convertible bond universe during the recent decade. Furthermore, my results are robust to 
alternative measures for classifying convertible bonds. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper makes several contributions. First, it is the first paper to examine what 
drives US firms to choose among convertible debt, debt, and equity in recent years by (1) 
splitting convertible debt into two sub-samples and distinguish between debt-like 
convertibles and equity-like convertibles and (2) examining the choice between 
convertibles and debt and the choice between convertibles and equity by running binary 
logistic regressions. Second, it is the first paper to (1) consider convertibles as a substitute 
for debt and equity at the same time by incorporating convertibles as a third type of 
security in a mutually exclusive security choice pool and (2) examine the determinants of 
a firm's security choice by setting up multinomial logistic regressions. Finally, my paper 
is the first to examine how issuance decisions vary in different types of industries by 
exploring determinants of a firm's issuance choice separately for high-tech and non-tech 
firms. 
My full sample results are similar to those of Lewis at al. (1999). In terms of the 
choice between two securities (debt-like securities vs. equity-like securities), firms with 
higher tax shields, higher profitability, larger and older firms are more likely to issue 
debt-like securities while smaller and younger firms having issues during or after the year 
1999 with better pre-announcement performance are more likely to issue equity-like 
securities. The analysis of high-tech and non-tech firms suggests that non-tech firms with 
consecutive issues are more likely to issue equity-like securities and while non-tech firms 
with higher profitability are more likely to issue debt-like securities, conditioning on 
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keeping other determinants (firm size, stock run-up, firm age) having the same level of 
influence on security choice as those reported in the high-tech sub-sample. 
In terms of the choice between two securities (debt-like convertibles vs. debt), 
firms with higher leverage, risk, and profitability, fewer growth opportunities, smaller 
issue amount, better pre-announcement performance and high-tech firms are more likely 
to issue debt-like convertible debt than straight debt when the economic environment is 
reflecting of a high financing-cost for both debt and equity, which supports to Green's 
(1984) sweetened debt hypothesis. The differences between high-tech and non-tech firms 
is remarkable in the sense that younger non-tech firms are more likely to issue debt-like 
convertible debt, conditioning on keeping all other determinants (except relative issue 
size) having the same level of influence on security choice as those reported in the full 
sample . 
In terms of the choice between equity-like convertibles vs. equity), larger non-
tech firms with higher leverage, smaller issue size, lower profitability, and worse pre-
announcement stock performance are more likely to issue equity-like convertible debt 
than equity, which provides partial support for Stein's (1992) delayed equity hypothesis. 
The difference between high-tech and non-tech firms is larger non-tech firms with higher 
leverage are more likely to issue equity-like convertible debt than equity. 
When exploring a firm's simultaneous choice among three securities in a multi-
nominal model, I find that the results for leverage, issue size, volatility, and stock ret are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 8 and leverage, firm size, issue size, and 
stock ret are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 9. The results in Table 10 
show that smaller and younger firms with higher leverage, higher firm risk, smaller issue 
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size, and better pre-announcement performance are more likely to issue convertible debt 
than straight debt while larger and older age firms with higher leverage, higher firm risk, 
smaller issue size, and worse pre-announcement performance are more likely to issue 
convertible debt than equity. This partially supports the pecking order model as 
convertible debt is viewed as a substitute for debt. The sequential model also receives 
some limited supports as firms with low financial distress risk and firm risk tend to use 
convertibles to solve the sequential financing problem, which is only proved in the choice 
between convertible debt and debt but not in the choice between convertible and equity. 
Further, my results support to the agency model that claims that firms with worse pre-
announcement performance prefer to issue convertible debt over debt and that firms with 
better pre-announcement performance prefer to issue equity over convertible debt. The 
difference between high-tech and non-tech firms is that non-tech firms with higher 
leverage are expected to issue convertible debt other than debt and equity conditioning on 
keeping firm size having the same level of influence on security choice as those reported 
in the full sample, which only supports the sweetened debt hypothesis but not the delayed 
equity hypothesis that claims that firms with higher financial risk prefer to issue equity 
rather than convertibles. 
My security choice model controls for economy-wide factors. The results indicate 
that these factors have a significant incremental impact over firm-specific characteristics 
on the convertible debt choice. 
During my sample selection process, it became apparent that there are about two 
of three (100 out of 153) dual/triple issuers. Based on the extant research in this area, I 
have excluded the respective observations from my sample. However, an interesting 
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question that arises is what motivates firms to issue both convertible debts together with 
straight debt and/or equity at same time, i.e. in the same year. Given the high frequency 
with which additional security issues are tied to convertibles it would certainly be 
interesting to shine some light on this question and I would encourage future researchers 
to consider investigating this phenomenon. 
With respect to future research, other studies could further focus on security 
issuance choice in an international setting since there has been several papers document 
that convertible debt is particularly popular in the Australian and European market, which 
stands in contrast to the decreasing popularity of convertible debt in the US market 
during the same time period. Also an extra investigation could be conducted regarding 
the influence of the T-bill rate on a firm's security choice, which leaves as a puzzle for 
now. To my knowledge, no such investigations have been conducted to date, and I 
believe that understanding of the new the security choice determinants differ across 
different economic stages and on a global level. 
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Figure 1 US New Security Issues Universe by Amount 1997-2007 
This figure reports all US new security issues including debt; convertible debt, and equity from 1997-2007. 
"% of amount of year" is calculated by one security's yearly amount over another security's yearly amout. 
For example, in 1997, "% of amount of year" for cvt/debt is 6.17% which is calculated by 5666.6/91766.9 
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Figure 2 US New Security Issues Universe by Frequency 1997-2007 
This figure reports ail US new security issues including debt, convertible debt, and equity from 1997-2007. 
"% of # issues of year" is calculated by one security's yearly issues over another security's yearly issues. 
For example, in 1997, "% of # issues of year" for cvt/debt is 5.1% which is calculated by 30/588 (thes 
numbers sre from Table 2). 
i cvt/debt 
icvt/equity 
/ ^ J> J> ^ jf> ^ ^ ^ ^ / *" 
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Figure 3 US New Security Issues Sample by Amount 1997-2007 
This figure reports US new security issues sample including debt, convertible debt, and equity from 1997-
2007. "% of amount of year" is calculated by one security's yearly amount over another security's yearly 
amout. For example, in 1997, "% of amount of year" for cvt/debt is 13.33% which is calculated by 90/675 
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Figure 4 US New Security Issues Sample by Frequency 1997-2007 
This figure reports US new security issues sample including debt, convertible debt, and equity from 1997-
2007. "% of # issues of year" is calculated by one security's yearly issues over another security's yearly 
issues. For example, in 1997, "% of # issues of year" for cvt/debt is 50% which is calculated by 1/2 (thes 
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1 Agricultural Production Crops 
7 Agricultural Services 
8 Forestry 
10 Metal Mining 
12 Coal Mining 
13 Oil And Gas Extraction 
Mining And Quarrying Of Nonmetallic 
14 Minerals 
15 Building Construction General 
16 Heavy Construction 
17 Construction Special Trade Contractors 
20 Food And Kindred Products 
22 Textile Mill Products 
23 Apparel And Other Finished Products 
Lumber And Wood Products, Except 
24 Furniture 
25 Furniture And Fixtures 
26 Paper And Allied Products 
27 Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries 
28 Chemicals And Allied Products 
29 Petroleum Refining And Related Industries 
Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics 
30 Products 
31 Leather And Leather Products 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete Products 
33 Primary Metal Industries 
34 Fabricated Metal Products 
35 Industrial And Commercial Machinery 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment (Except 
36 Computer equipment) 
37 Transportation Equipment 
Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling 
38 Instruments 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 
40 Railroad Transportation 
Local And Suburban Transit And 
41 Interurban Highway Transportation 
Motor Freight Transportation And 
42 Warehousing 
44 Water Transportation 
45 Transportation By Air 
47 Transportation Services 
48 Communications 
49 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services 
50 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 





















































Building Materials, Hardware, etc. 
General Merchandise Stores 
Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Service 
Stations 
Apparel And Accessory Stores 
Home Furniture, Furnishings, And 
Equipment Stores 
Eating And Drinking Places 
Miscellaneous Retail 
Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, And 
Other Lodging Places 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking 
Miscellaneous Repair Services 
Motion Pictures 




Engineering, Accounting, Research, 

















































































Total 33 100 286 100 838 100 
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Table 4 Sample selection 
The following table illustrates our sample creation process for US. New issues securities including 
convertible bonds, debts, and equity issues during 1997-2007 period. 
Process Convertibles Debt Equity 
from SDC (by issues) 
from SDC (by unique firms) 
after excluding dual & triple issues* 
after merging with CRSP 
after merging with CompuStat 




















(1) Dual issues example: in Aug, 2001, Walt Disney Co. issued 7.375% bonds due in May, 2019 and 
2.125% convertible senior notes due in Apr, 2008. 
(2) Triple issues example: in May, 1999, Adelphia Communications Corp issued 7.875% senior notes due 
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oi o o o o o o l 
Table 7 Binary regressions: debt-like securities vs. equity-like securities 
This table reports results for a binary regression of Model 1, debt-like securities vs. equity-like securities from 1997 to 2007 as well as two 
sub-sample based on high-tech issues and non-tech issues. The dependent variable is the security type, and is assigned a value of 1 for 
equity-like securities; 0 for otherwise. Definitions for all variables are given in Table 5. The percentage of concordant, the sample size and the 
pseudo R-squares are reported in the last three rows. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 



























Pseudo Rz (%) 
#obs. debt-like 
# obs. equity-like 































































































































































































































































































Pseudo R2 (%) 
#obs. debt-like 
# obs. equity-like 




































































































































































































































































Table 8 Binary regressions: debt vs. debt-like convertibles 
This table reports results for a binary regression of Model 2, debt vs. debt-like convertibles from 1997 to 2007 as well as two sub-sample 
based on high-tech issues and non-tech issues. The dependent variable is the security type, and is assigned a value of 1 for debt-like 
convertibles; 0 for otherwise. Definitions for all variables are given in Table 5. The percentage of concordant, the sample size and the pseudo 




























Pseudo R2 (%) 
# obs. debt 
# obs. debt-like cvt 








































































































































































































































































































Pseudo R2 (%) 
#obs. debt 
# obs. debt-like cvt 












































































































































































































































































Table 9 Binary regressions: equity vs. equity-like convertibles 
This table reports results for a binary regression of Model 3, equity vs. equity-like convertibles from 1997 to 2007 as well as the sub-sample 
based on non-tech issues, the high-tech issues results are provided in Appendix. The dependent variable is the security type, and is assigned a 
value of 1 for equity-like convertibles; 0 for otherwise. Definitions for all variables are given in Table 5. The percentage of concordant, the 
sample size and the pseudo R-squares are reported in the last three rows. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Panel A 
Expected 
























Pseudo R2 (%) 
# obs. equity 
# obs. equity-like cvt 
















































































































































































Table 9 (continued) 




























Pseudo R2 (%) 
# obs. equity 
# obs. equity-like cvt 













































































































































































Table 10 Multi-nominal regressions: convertibles vs. debt vs. equity 
This table reports results for a multi-nominal regression of Model 4, convertibles vs. debt vs. equity from 1997 to 2007 as well as two sub-
sample based on high-tech issues and non-tech issues. The dependent variable is the security type, and is assigned a value of 0 for 
convertibles, 1 for debt, 2 for equity. Definitions for all variables are given in Table 5. The sample size and the pseudo R-squares are reported 


























Pseudo R2 (%) 
# obs. Cvt 
#obs. Debt 
#obs. Equity 



































































































































-26.5153*** + -11.6769*** 
(<.0001) (0.0016) 

















-1.5747 + -1.974 
(0.5199) (0.3161) 
























































































Table 10 (continued) 
Panel B 
Expected 























Pseudo R2 (%) 
# obs. Cvt 
# obs. Debt 
# obs. Equity 

















































































































































































































































































Pseudo R2 (%) 
# obs. Cvt 
# obs. Debt 
Sobs. Equity 



































































































































-26.1336*** + -7.6126** 
(<.0001) (0.0352) 

















-3.1981 + -5.1929*** 
(0.2055) (0.0094) 

















































































































Pseudo R2 (%) 
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Appendix 
This table reports results for a binary regression of Model 3, equity vs. equity-like convertibles for high-tech sub-sample from 1997 to 2007 
and may be viewed as a set of complementary results for Table 9. The dependent variable is the security type, and is assigned a value of 1 for 
equity-like convertibles; 0 for otherwise. Definitions for all variables are given in Table 5. The percentage of concordant, the sample size and 
the pseudo R-squares are reported in the last three rows. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Notes: Explanation of High-Technology Industry Definition 
AeA, stands for American Electronics Association as in the followings, uses 45 
SIC codes to define the high-technology industry. We recognize that these 45 SIC codes 
do not comprehensively cover the entire high-tech industry as the structure of the SIC 
system is limited. In an effort to produce solid statistics, AeA's definition consists of SIC 
codes that fall into three broad categories ~ high-tech manufacturing, communications 
services, and software and computer-related services. It does not include broad categories 
if the high-tech portion does not represent a clear majority. Also, AeA's definition does 
not include many "related" industries, such as biotechnology, engineering services, and 
research and testing services. 
Other industry groups not covered in AeA's definition of the high-tech industry 
include wholesale and retail trade of high-tech goods. The biotechnology industry also is 
not included because current U.S. government statistics do not allow us clearly to identify 
which portion is "bio" and which is "tech." The matter is further complicated because 
there is no clear consensus on the definition of the biotechnology industry. 
The U.S. government's SIC codes do not capture temporary high-tech workers, as 
the SIC codes place all temporary employees together under SIC 7363, help supply 
services. However, a study by the National Association of Temporary and Staffing 
Services found that on any given day in 1997, there were nearly 2.5 million people 
working as temporary employees. The study found that technical workers, which include 
computer programmers and computer systems analysts, comprised 14 percent of the 
temporary help industry payroll in 1997. However, this category also includes other 
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temporary workers, such as designers, editors, and illustrators. Present data allow us to 
assume only that there are tens of thousands of high-tech temporary workers nationally, 
but they are not included in our statistical analysis. 
List of 45 SIC Codes 
AeA uses 45 SIC codes that fall into three general groupings ~ high-tech 
manufacturing, communications services, and software and computer-related services — 
to define the U.S. high-technology industry 
HIGH-TECH MANUFACTURING 
Computers and Office Equipment 
3571 Electronic Computers 
3572 Computer Storage Devices 
3575 Computer Terminals 
3577 Computer Peripherals 
3578 Calculating and Accounting Machines 
3579 Office Machines 
Consumer Electronics 
3651 Household Audio and Video Equipment 
3652 Phonographic Records and Prerecorded Tapes and Disks 
Communications Equipment 
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus 
3663 Radio and TV Broadcast and Communications Equipment 
3669 Other Communications Equipment 
Electronic Components and Accessories 
3671 Electron Tubes 
3672 Printed Circuit Boards 
3675 Electronic Capacitors 
3676 Electronic Resistors 
3677 Electronic Coils, Transformers, and Inductors 
3678 Electronic Connectors 
3679 Other Electronic Components 
Semiconductors 
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices 
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Industrial Electronics 
3821 Laboratory Apparatus 
3822 Environmental Controls 
3823 Process Control Instruments 
3824 Fluid Meters and Counting Devices 
3825 Instruments to Measure Electricity 
3826 Laboratory Analytical Instruments 
3829 Other Measuring and Controlling Devices 
Photonics 
3827 Optical Instruments and Lenses 
3861 Photographic Equipment and Lenses 
Defense Electronics 
3812 Search and Navigation Systems, Instruments, and Equipment 
Electromedical Equipment 
3844 X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes and Related Irradiation Apparatus 
3845 Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus 
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 
4812 Radiotelephone Communications 
4813 Telephone Communications 
4822 Telegraph and Other Message Communications 
4841 Cable and Other Pay Television Services 
4899 Other Communications Services 
SOFTWARE AND COMPUTER-RELATED SERVICES 
Software Services 
7371 Computer Programming Services 
7372 Prepackaged Software 
7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design 
Data Processing and Information Services 
7374 Computer Processing and Data Preparation 
7375 Information Retrieval Services 
7376 Computer Facilities Management Services 
Rental, Maintenance, and Other Computer-Related Services 
7377 Computer Rental and Leasing 
7378 Computer Maintenance and Repair 
7379 Other Computer-Related Services 
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